It was a necessary reminder of first principles. But the real question is not what federalism is meant to be. It is what it has become. The fact that judges keep issuing such reminders is itself revealing. It suggests that the gap between constitutional design and political practice is widening, and that something fundamental is not working.

On paper, India's federal structure is well balanced. Power is distributed, diversity is accommodated, and there are sufficient mechanisms for coordination. However, in practice, the relationship is less cooperative and more conditional; less dialogic and more adversarial. An obvious sign of this trend is how federal disputes are often resolved through litigation. What once belonged to the political realm - fiscal disagreements, administrative conflicts, and issues related to gubernatorial conduct - are all settled in courtrooms. A mature federation, as Justice Nagarathna noted, should not depend so heavily on judicial intervention. It shows that our political processes, which should sustain federal balance through negotiation, accommodation, and mutual restraint, are weakening. Courts are forced to step in because other mechanisms are failing.

To understand why this is happening, one must look beyond constitutional provisions at the changing nature of Indian democracy. The latest report by the V-Dem Institute offers a useful lens. According to its findings, India ranks 105 out of 179 countries on the liberal democracy index and continues to be classified as an "electoral autocracy" - a category marked by declining democratic indices even as elections remain vigorously contested. The term is worth pausing over. An electoral autocracy is not a system without elections. But other essential features, such as freedom of expression, institutional autonomy, and a fair political playing field, show signs of erosion. Seen this way, the strain on federalism is part of a broader pattern: the gradual centralisation of power.

On the contrary, the constitutional vision of federalism rests on a culture of restraint. Both the Union and the states must work in genuine partnership. Unfortunately, contemporary politics has failed to adhere to this important principle. The Union government believes that only through centralisation, control, and the marginalisation of opposition-ruled states can it exercise authority. For these marginalised states, resistance becomes a necessity and a strategy. In the resultant atmosphere of conflict, federal principles are invariably sidelined or ignored.

Take fiscal relations as an example. When GST was introduced, it was framed as cooperative federalism in action. But today, several states continue to raise concerns about shrinking fiscal space, delayed compensation, and asymmetric financial transfers. If the Constitution imagines states as equal partners, the lived reality has reduced them to petitioners.

Rhetoric vs reality

Institutions meant to act as neutral intermediaries are also being drawn into political contestation. The role of governors has become contentious. Central agencies, including the CBI, ED, and the ECI, are frequently perceived, rightly or wrongly, as instruments of political pressure. When autonomous institutions lose their neutrality, federal balance is disturbed not through formal amendments but through everyday governance. Federalism depends not just on rules, but on a willingness to respect boundaries even when one has the power to override them. Unfortunately, that restraint is weakening now.

Although the V-Dem report does not directly address federalism, its diagnosis of democratic backsliding, weakening institutional autonomy, and the concentration of power has direct implications for the federal structure. When power concentrates, federalism is often the first casualty. Centralisation may be politically rewarding as it strengthens the Union government's hand and shapes national narratives. But it weakens the states.

India still possesses one of the most detailed federal constitutions in the world, and its formal structures remain intact. But the lived experience tells a different story: one of growing tension, declining trust, and increasing centralisation. The question before us is not whether federalism will survive. It will certainly, at least in form. But what kind of federalism will India practise? Will it be a system of genuine partnership, grounded in mutual respect? Or will autonomy exist largely on paper? Justice Nagarathna's statement is a reminder that federalism, more than a constitutional arrangement, is a democratic ethic. For it to be realised, the Union must commit to balance, restraint, and dialogue. If not, federalism will exist more in rhetoric than in reality, and what we may be witnessing is not a breakdown of the Constitution, but a quiet transformation of it.

(The writer is an educator and political analyst based in Bengaluru)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.