India's military reforms need empowered theatre commands, unified authority and faster integrated operational decision-making mechanisms

War offers no consolation prizes. While its character evolves, its unforgiving nature does not. Three trends today demand urgent adaptation.

First, technology is compressing decision timelines. ISR transparency, precision fires, and autonomous systems have shrunk the window between detection and destruction. Second, perception and information operations now unfold in real time, shaping domestic and international responses before kinetic actions conclude. Third, the cost of new technologies requires disciplined prioritisation, for niche technologies cannot be everywhere at scale. Even the wealthiest militaries are learning to match response to threat and learning that technology cannot substitute boots on ground.

In this environment, the side that cycles through the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop faster prevails. India's current command architecture of 14 single service regional commands, operating through layered headquarters and integrating through Delhi, cannot match the decision speed of adversaries who have reorganised for integrated, theatre level operations.

The concept is simple: integrate all warfighting elements-Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard-under unified Theatre Commanders responsible for specific fronts. Today, the China front requires coordination across six separate single service commands; the Pakistan front across nine. Each must first coordinate within its own service, then through Service HQs in Delhi, and finally through HQ IDS and then orders flow backwards. This structure optimized for the 1970s, guarantees slower decision cycles than adversaries who operate under unified theatres. Pakistan, despite its internal dysfunctions, has a single military decision making centre. China reorganised into Theatre Commands in 2016. Into our seventh year of study, we cannot keep deliberating Theaterisation ad-infinitum.

The Prime Minister presciently recognised this early, and has in nine addresses since 2014 to the Combined Commanders of the three services and the Chiefs, emphasised the need to prioritise modernisation, and preparation for speedier, seamless decisions. This before the Chinese Theaterised in 2016. In fact, appointing the first CDS in end Dec 2019, the Govt amongst others gave a specific charter to theaterise the services. 'Akin to the Andaman & Nicobar Command' (ANC), as the CDS tasked the services. The ANC is currently India's only Integrated Theatre Command of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard that has been functioning successfully since 2001 when the Kargil Review Committee and Group of Ministers reports recommended its raising as also raising of other tri-service organisations like the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and a CDS (not appointed for over 18 years thereafter).

As the 2nd CDS completes his extended tenure, much progress has been made in joint structures for operations, intelligence, logistics, IT, training, maintenance, HR, and legal frameworks. As recently shared by the CDS in an address, recommendations for Theatre Commands have now been forwarded to the MoD for a 3rd time - with the consensus of a different set of Service Chiefs.

On the cusp of Theaterisation orders, there is a non-partisan observation. Most defence reforms have happened under NDA govts. PM Vajpayee ordered the ANC, SFC, & HQ IDS raisings and the appointment of a CDS. Some veterans in the know also share that one evening in 2003 he had even nominated a CDS. However, past midnight he cancelled his orders, when woken up by two senior Congressmen and convinced that the Air Force was not in concurrence. Hence, appointing a CDS in Dec 2019, alongwith the Theaterisation charter given to him, was a bold step of PM Modi. Even the integrating of all Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard lands at ANC under the CINCAN in 2017. Similarly, impetus given to space and cyber issues, or the new red lines for cross-border terrorism. Not only Operation Sindoor, but also the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty. Steps inspiring confidence that national security issues are being rightly addressed.

Institutional resistance is natural. Services will fear loss of turf, influence, and control. Every major military that has integrated has faced similar resistance. But the stakes are too high to allow inertia to dictate outcomes.

The deeper issue is structural. Initially Service Chiefs focused on Raise-Train-Sustain (RTS) and strategic advice. As communications improved, they gradually assumed operational control over their regional commands. This diluted subordinate authority. Even at ANC, for 18 years component commanders remained more accountable to their parent service than to the Commander-in-Chief (CINCAN).

At ANC this changed in 2021, when on CINCAN recommendation, the CDS removed Service Chiefs from the reporting chain of officers posted to tri-service organisations. The impact was immediate: ANC achieved more integration in two years than in the previous 18.

The lesson is clear. Unity of command requires clarity of authority. This begets the central question: Who Commands the Theatre? If Theatre Commands are to be operationally effective, their commanders must be empowered and accountable. This requires: (a) Theatre Commanders of 4-star rank, equal to Service Chiefs; (b) Direct operational authority to them over all forces in their theatre; and (c) Service Chiefs focusing on RTS, doctrine, capability development and ceremonial aspects. 3-star Theatre Commanders will inevitably be overshadowed by 4-star Service Chiefs, leading to back seat control and diluted authority-precisely the problem ANC faced for nearly two decades. Unity of command is not a slogan; it is a prerequisite for success in high tempo operations.

Span of control considerations also suggest the need for dedicated operational commanders. Today's operational environment demands continuous, theatre specific focus. Service Chiefs already shoulder a span of responsibilities unsustainable for long: RTS functions, advisory duties, visits to dozens of formations, procurement decisions, foreign engagements, media issues, and 24×7 operational oversight. Expecting them to simultaneously command large, multi-domain theatres through Committee Command of Theatres, alongwith service RTS functions is unrealistic. Theatre Commanders must be dedicated operational leaders, not minions of part time overseers.

24 years of ANC experience demonstrates that integration works when authority is clear. It was only when the CINCAN came under the CDS and got empowered that true integrative actions could be implemented. Between 2021 and 2023, amongst others, ANC implemented: Integrated operational planning throughits Joint Operations Centre; a common LAN; integrated administrative structures, repair, maintenance, logistics, and training; cross training of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Coast Guard personnel; integrated exercises and deployments; and a cultural "purple" (integrated) shift.

Consensual report to MoD notwithstanding, to implement theaterisation optimally, three issues need clarity to facilitate planning:

1. The Future of Single Service Regional Commands. To reduce decision time, Theatre Commands must directly control operational formations-Army Corps, Naval Fleets, and Air Bases. Retaining 14 single service Regional Commands and making a new Theatre HQ layer above them would only increase decision time.

2. Rank of Theatre Commanders. They must be 4-star. Anything less will recreate the ANC problem at a national scale.