The Bench held that the court, in such circumstances, could end the proceedings against that individual, as continuing the case would serve no useful purpose and would only restrict his liberty through the stigma of conviction and subsisting legal obligations, even if the proceedings continue against the remaining convicts.

The assertion came as Justice Anoop Chitkara set aside the conviction and sentence of appellant-convict in a snatching case. The appeal in the matter was filed by a 23-year-old convict, who had challenged his conviction under provisions including Section 379A of the IPC. An FIR in the matter was registered on July 4, 2019, at Ladwa police station in Kurukshetra.

During the pendency of the appeal-while his sentence already stood suspended-the parties entered into a compromise, with the complainant unequivocally supporting the setting aside of the individual's conviction.

Core legal issue: Can compromise be accepted for one convict alone?

The Bench squarely addressed the legal dilemma arising in multi-convict cases: whether proceedings could be terminated selectively for one accused based on compromise. At the onset, the Court framed the issue: "The question which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the proceedings can be legally quashed or compromised qua the appellant alone."

Answering in the affirmative, the Bench concluded that there was no legal bar to such an approach where facts justified it, particularly when the compromise was genuine and voluntary.

Article 21 elevated over procedural continuation

The Court shifted focus from procedural rigidity to substantive justice and personal liberty in the matter by observing: "If the pendency of the criminal appeal qua the appellant-convict, who has already been released on suspension of sentence, is allowed to continue despite the compromise, the same would unnecessarily impinge upon his liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India."

The Bench added that the pendency of criminal proceedings continued to impose restrictions upon liberty "by way of subsisting bail bonds and the stigma of conviction" even in matters where the appellant was on bail.

Non-compoundable offence not a bar in exceptional cases

The Court took note of the fact that the offence was non-compoundable under procedural law. Yet, it carved out an exception based on judicial precedents and factual peculiarities. "In the present case, the conviction for offence under Section 379A is not compoundable. However, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the prosecution qua the non-compoundable offences can be closed."

Pragmatic approach over technical formalism

The Bench made it clear that a pragmatic approach would requirethe Court not to unnecessarily prolong the proceedings where a lawful compromise has been effected and "consider closing the proceedings qua the concerned convict."

Outcome: conviction set aside, acquittal granted

Taking into account the appellant's young age, partial sentence undergone, and the voluntary nature of compromise, the Court concluded the continuation of the proceedings with regard to the appellant-convict would serve no fruitful purpose."

Accordingly, the conviction and sentence were set aside, the appellant was acquitted, and his bail bonds discharged.

Drawing a clear line, the Court clarified that the benefit of compromise was strictly personal. "The acceptance of the present appeal shall have no bearing whatsoever on the other two convicts," the Bench asserted.

What it means

The ruling is significant as it underlines a calibrated shift in criminal jurisprudence-prioritizing individual liberty and restorative outcomes over rigid adherence to procedure. It signals that courts are willing to recognise individualised justice in multi-accused cases, ensuring that one convict's reconciliation is not held hostage to the pendency of proceedings against others.

The judgment makes it further that the criminal process is not an end in itself. Where the victim has settled, the offender has moved towards closure, and no overriding public interest demands continuation, the Constitution's promise of liberty must prevail over procedural inertia.