Now we know that we can pay even the most powerful countries in the world to fight for us."

My conversation with the Oxford-educated Bishara, a consummate Gulf diplomat at a time when university education was not widespread in the region, took place on the sidelines of the GCC summit in Kuwait in December 1991. The entire Gulf - indeed the entire world, except for three United Nations member countries - had coalesced around Kuwait for the UN-sanctioned liberation war against Iraqi occupation.

According to GCC sources in Riyadh now, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have shifted their postures in recent days from one of discomfort with Washington over having dragged them into a war they did not want. They are presently urging the US to decisively defeat Iran, although they are not explicitly saying so in public.

That makes my conversation with Bishara a case of history repeating itself. US President Donald Trump has already said the Gulf states should pay for their protection by the US - a variation of his constant complaints that the Europeans are freeloaders and don’t pay enough for their security, for which the Pentagon shells out its resources disproportionately. When this war ends - whichever way - the Gulf countries may find that they will have to pay the US, or anyone else, to fight for them or to ensure their safety in future.

Only about 5% of the people living in the UAE are its citizens and very few of them are in the military’s permanent service or constitute a fighting force. Yemenis are a big component of the UAE Army and cannot be trusted not to turn against their host country in a crisis, given the blood-soaked recent history of UAE-Yemen relations.

A disproportionate majority of Bahrain’s population are Shias, who are ruled by a Sunni King. Signs of simmering discontent in favour of Shia Iran - which claims the whole of Bahrain as its territory - have been visible in the kingdom since the start of the war against Iran. The security establishment in Manama is cracking down on suspected fifth columnists and pro-Iranian spies among this Shia population.

The Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy, which is supported by the European Commission and the bipartisan National Endowment for Democracy in the US, have been documenting wartime excesses by the Sunni-controlled state machinery in Bahrain.

In the five weeks since Iranian drone and missile attacks against the Arab Gulf began, the UAE has encouraged unprecedentedly free and open discussions in public regarding its future national security architecture. Reem Al Hashimy and Noura Al Kaabi, the two women ministers of state for foreign affairs, have emerged as the most articulate advocates on this subject.

Al Hashimy, who has been addressing foreign audiences, was pointedly asked by an Australian television network a few days ago if Iranian attacks on the UAE had prompted the country to reconsider the US military presence in its midst, especially in the form of American bases. She replied: “Quite the contrary. Our relationship with the US is one that does not falter in moments of crisis."

Al Kaabi wrote in an Abu Dhabi daily, The National, last week that Iran’s missile programme could no longer “co-exist safely with regional stability…We want a normal neighbour. We want a guarantee that this will never happen again".

That guarantee must come from lasting security arrangements: disarmament of the capabilities turned against civilians; the permanent preservation of freedom of navigation; and a framework that enforces accountability rather than merely recording condemnation."

What these and other similar pronouncements suggest is that while there is a recognition that US military presence in itself is no more a guarantee of safety, Gulf security can only come from completely disarming Iran. This implicitly requires the US and Israel - without naming or speaking of the role of the Jewish state - to complete the job they started on February 28.

Oman is totally disenchanted with the US and feels betrayed that Trump started the war when the talks midwifed by Muscat were close to agreeing on solutions to Iran’s nuclear-cum-missile conundrum. Oman refused to host any further peace initiatives.

It was into this vacuum that Pakistan stepped in and offered to convey messages back and forth between Washington and Tehran. Qatar is delighted that an alliance between Saudi Arabia and the UAE - which was instrumental in a boycott of Qatar in 2017 along with Egypt and Bahrain - is broken.

Kuwait’s arrogance, which was reflected in Bishara’s assertion, is now long gone. It has been left behind in every way by several of its co-founders of the GCC.

The plurilateral grouping of Gulf’s Sunni monarchies had barely recovered from the fallout of the Qatar boycott, which ended in 2021, when the current war in the region started. Gulf Arabs routinely call each other “brothers" and are very good at window-dressing differences. So the GCC is likely to present a fake façade of unity when the Iran-Israel-US war is over.

Others, like India, will however, see through this familiar pattern in regional diplomacy and adjust their dealings with the GCC. The group will be a pale shadow of what it once promised to be after Iraq’s decisive defeats in 1991 and 2003 and a nuclear deal with Iran during Barack Obama’s White House tenure, which Trump tore up during his first presidency.

Saudi Arabia, traditionally low profile on the outside, but firm and farsighted behind closed doors, will have an enhanced regional role when the current war ends. The UAE’s efforts to chart a diplomatic path, independent of Riyadh, and grow its already pre-eminent economic role beyond the Gulf into all of West Asia and North Africa lie in ruins because of the war and its future consequences.

At 40, Saudi Arabia’s de-facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al- Saud, is the youngest of the Arab Gulf’s leaders. But so far in the region’s constant evolution, speeded up by the war, he has proved to be its wisest.