However, even after 10 years, there remains a difference of opinion among the three services regarding the structure of integrated theatre commands.

The template for the Indian theatre command is based on the US' theatre command. In the US, the reforms were implemented by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 in response to the shortcomings noticed in operations.

Conversely, India is striving to enhance the efficiency of a system that has thus far performed reasonably well in all the wars. Given the limited defence budget and the constant threat of a two-front war, it would be prudent for India to not replicate the US system, which has given mixed results so far and is still evolving.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the US was involved in various military operations. In many operations, poor inter-service coordination, fragmented command structures and inter-service rivalry were observed. The shortcomings were particularly glaring during the Vietnam War, Iran hostage rescue attempt and Grenada invasion. The Iran mission collapsed due to the lack of a unified command, poor planning and inadequate coordination of assets.

To address these shortcomings, the US Congress debated the issue for over four years and passed The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986. The Act created three separate command structures with the intention of ending inter-service rivalries and fighting the wars under a single theatre commander. The reforms included the following:

l Combatant or theatre commanders were given full operational control of the forces and they reported directly to the President.

l Service chiefs lost operational authority and were only responsible for training, equipping and doctrine development.

l The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was designated as the principal military adviser to strengthen joint planning, but didn’t have control over operations or training.

However, these reforms couldn’t end the inter-service rivalry. The competition merely shifted from operations to budgets, doctrines and resource allocations. Moreover, the reforms created a new disconnect. The services, responsible for training and doctrines, were not accountable for actual war-fighting. On the other hand, the combatant commanders in charge of conducting operations had minimal influence over training, doctrine and force development. Additionally, because of the limited tenure of combatant commanders, they were not concerned with the long-term development of the forces.

This mismatch created capability gaps between what the forces were trained for and what the combat demanded. The system is under review.

The US could absorb these shortcomings because there was no threat to its territorial integrity and it had substantial resources to tolerate duplications and inefficiencies. But, India cannot afford such luxuries. With immediate threats and limited depth, it cannot risk similar inefficiencies.

Firstly, India has a limited defence budget, which is barely sufficient for the maintenance and modernisation of the forces. Creating multiple integrated commands, over and above the existing geographical commands, risks spreading the budget too thin.

Secondly, unlike the US, India faces two nuclear-armed adversaries and any dilution of combat efficiency may prove disastrous.

Furthermore, while the US theatre commands are located far apart and are separated by oceans, India’s combat commands, geographical commands and headquarters will all be co-located. This arrangement would simply add an extra bureaucratic layer to the existing structure. Even for a short skirmish of four days, the IAF had to pool resources from multiple regional commands to meet operational objectives. Dividing the limited resources in a piecemeal manner may reduce their effectiveness.

Another often-quoted advantage of the theatre command is that the political leadership will be able to obtain a comprehensive status of operations from a single source, which would help it in taking a timely and informed decision. It is possible for the US, where the theatres are far apart and operations in one theatre don’t affect the others.

In India, the theatres are small and contiguous. With the threat of a two-front war, any operation in one theatre is likely to affect adjacent theatres also. The political leadership will have to talk to all theatre commanders before deciding on operations, thereby defeating the basic concept. True jointness can be achieved by common training, interoperable equipment and joint planning; not by creating another layer over the existing ones.

Instead of replicating the US system, which has multiple theatre commands because of the expeditionary requirement across the globe, India could adopt a single-theatre model, reflecting its defensive nature, geography, resource limits and threat profiles. The entire country may be considered as a single theatre so that there is a flexibility to shift forces between the fronts, as per the requirement.

The theatre may be headed by the CDS, responsible for strategy, and a single point of contact for the government. It should have the authority for planning, prioritisation in modernisation and wartime co-operation. The chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force could be component commanders, directly accountable for the employment and performance of their forces. The regional commands could fight the war under a single theatre, as per their domain expertise. Such a structure would ensure an effective and efficient asset utilisation, without duplication or bureaucratic layers. In future, if the country acquires sufficient resources and defence budget, the option of multiple theatre commands may be revisited.

In conclusion, India must avoid repeating the US mistakes. For India, with adversaries on its borders and limited resources, the safest path is a single-theatre model, led by the CDS, with the service chiefs as component commanders. This will ensure jointness without additional bureaucracy, maximise the availability of scarce resources and ensure the unity of effort in the face of real and immediate threats.

Air Marshal Amit Tiwari (retd) is former AOC-in-C Central Air Command.