For nearly three decades, India's defence partnerships have centred on four countries: Russia, Israel, the US and France. The cooperation extends well beyond military-to-military engagement.
It encompasses technology, trade and industrial collaboration - from acquiring high-end systems unavailable indigenously to co-developing advanced platforms - all aimed at achieving self-reliance (atmanirbharta). Today, amidst major geopolitical disruptions, India’s defence partners, except for France, are facing headwinds. This turbulence reinforces the need to diversify defence partnerships, as has been done for supply chains, energy and trade.
According to recent reports published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), during 2021-2025, India sourced 40% of its arms from Russia, 29% from France and 15% from Israel, while the US contributed approximately 10-11%. Despite the rhetoric, most acquisitions remain essentially buyer-seller relationships, with limited genuine technology transfer.
Turbulence in India-US relations during the Trump 2.0 presidency has eroded trust. Despite the “Framework for the US-India Major Defence Partnership" that concluded in October 2025, the “hesitation of history" - that familiar reluctance characterising the pre-2000 relationship - is seemingly re-emerging.
Russia, once the source of over 70% of India’s arms, has had its share decline to 36-40% this decade, though for structural reasons: the Ukraine war, western sanctions, export logistics and the changing preferences in weapons procurement. There is, fortunately, no erosion of mutual trust. Of the originally contracted five units of S-400s (contracted in October 2018, with deliveries planned by 2023), the fourth unit is now being delivered (dispatched from Russia) and the last one is likely to follow by the end of the year - a delay of nearly three years. Despite the delays, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), in March 2026, approved the proposal for the acquisition of five more units. Notwithstanding the positive trend in defence relations, Russia’s likely capability constraints, post-Ukraine, need to be factored into long-term strategic planning.
Israel occupies a niche space as a precision technology provider – 34% of its defence exports of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), cyber, missile defence and precision-targeting systems are to India. Many of these were employed effectively during `Operation Sindoor’ last year. Yet, at present, Israel seems strategically overextended. Its economy is under strain, having already spent $11-18 billion on ongoing operations. Manpower shortages, depleted armament stocks and diplomatic isolation imposed by some European countries are straining their defence industry. Despite Israel remaining a reliable partner, supplementary options need to be explored.
Against this backdrop, two of Asia’s most capable industrialised democracies - the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan - present viable options for a complementary defence partnership, particularly because they share similar national security concerns.
ROK’s security calculus has shifted dramatically under Trump 2.0. The US Defence Strategy 2026 places primary responsibility for countering North Korea’s conventional threat on Seoul itself. US forces stationed in Korea have been earmarked for a Taiwan contingency. Of serious concern to the ROK, both Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD anti-missile systems were redeployed from the Korean Peninsula to West Asia at the outbreak of the Iran conflict - a signal of Seoul’s relegation in Washington’s strategic priorities. Confidence in the US nuclear umbrella is also eroding. Meeting these security challenges, the ROK is also likely to be in search of additional defence partners.
From an Indian perspective, the ROK possesses strong defence industrial capabilities. It is now the world’s ninth-largest arms exporter. It produces the K9 self-propelled Howitzer, the K2 Black Panther main battle tank, the KF-21 advanced multirole fighter, the FA-50 light combat aircraft and the KSS-III ballistic missile-capable submarines. Besides other areas of convergence, the ROK, like India, remains dependent on the GE-414 engines for its fighter programme. To mitigate this limitation, it is pursuing indigenous aero-engine development – a shared aspiration with India.
The April visit of ROK President Lee Jae Myung to India and the multi-domain Special Strategic Partnership envisioned for 2026-2030, including the launch of the Korea-India Defence Accelerator (KIND-X) innovation platform, provides the institutional underpinning for deeper cooperation.
Another potential Asian defence partner, Japan, recently amended its “Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology" in April, removing the restriction that limited overseas transfers to only five categories. India is among the 17 countries for which the scope of defence exports, including lethal systems, has been significantly expanded. This is a deliberate effort by Tokyo to revitalise its defence industry and strengthen its own national security posture.
There are, however, substantial structural challenges in furthering this relationship: a nascent defence export culture, complex defence acquisition procedures on both sides and lingering constitutional and public sensitivities in Japan. It would be pragmatic to commence with bilateral technology cooperation, which could evolve into defence-industrial cooperation, trade and operational coordination.
Though seemingly aspirational now, there exists a compelling strategic logic to develop a trilateral defence partnership between India, the ROK and Japan. All three face pressure from an assertive China, uncertainty about US security commitments (accentuated after the May 2026 Trump visit to China), and the imperative to build indigenous defence capabilities. A workable template also exists in various India-US Defence Technology cooperation initiatives.
A pragmatic way ahead could be to commence Track 2 and Track 1.5 dialogues structured around select think tanks to arrive at some pathfinder programmes. These engagements could bring together a wide range of stakeholders beyond the government and the military – to include industry, academia, innovators and investors on both sides for discussions free from official trappings. Exploratory areas could include aero engines, air and ballistic missile defence systems, defence-related AI, a family of autonomous systems, etc. These outcomes could then be advanced through the 2+2 dialogue.
To conclude, India values the existing defence and security partnerships built over decades. The ongoing geopolitical turbulence, however, demands more than consolidation of existing ties; it demands strategic foresight and diversification. Shared security concerns and self-reliance aspirations make India, Japan, and the ROK partners of choice. The recent visit to India by the President of the ROK and Japan’s amendment to the regulations governing the transfer of defence equipment and technology, both in late April 2026, have created an enabling environment to take this prospect further.