They have repeatedly emphasised minimal dependence on imported materiel, strategic autonomy in arms acquisition, and issued successive Positive Indigenisation Lists - earlier termed Negative Import Lists - that progressively reserved scores of military platforms and thousands of sub-systems and components for domestic production.

The policy's enduring objective has been unambiguous: to create a self-sustaining defence-industrial base (DIB) capable of designing, developing, manufacturing and eventually exporting much of the country's future military hardware and war-fighting equipment.

Yet, in a striking policy paradox, New Delhi is simultaneously negotiating a Reciprocal Defence Procurement Agreement (RDPA) with Washington as part of its broader effort to resolve bilateral trade disputes and finalise a wider economic and commercial package encompassing strategic sectors.

The RDPA traces its origins to June 2023, when then US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin's visit to New Delhi placed reciprocal defence procurement on the bilateral agenda. The initiative gathered further momentum during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's official visit to Washington later that month, with both governments incorporating it into a broader roadmap for defence-industrial cooperation.

By October 2023, the Pentagon had formally initiated negotiations on the agreement by inviting public and industry comments on granting India "qualifying country" status under US procurement regulations, even as the extent of reciprocal access to India's own procurement market remained undetermined.

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Official sources in New Delhi, however, said no comparable public consultation or industry outreach appears to have been undertaken by the government on the broad contours and ramifications of the RDPA, despite its potentially far-reaching implications for the country's defence-industrial base (DIB) and its broader Aatmanirbhar agenda. With broader India-US trade negotiations now nearing closure, their outcome could also influence the final shape and scope of the RDPA.

But, once concluded, the RDPA is expected to establish a framework for reciprocal access to substantial segments of each country's defence procurement market, raising a fundamental question: can India reconcile its long-standing Aatmanirbhar objective of building a self-sustaining defence-industrial base (DIB) by opening that market to the world's largest military-industrial ecosystem?

Defence industry executives and security analysts contend that the central issue is not reciprocity itself, but the final shape of the India-US RDPA. They warn that, without adequate safeguards for domestic industry, it could tilt the competitive balance decisively in favour of far larger and better-resourced American defence firms, at a time when India's armed forces are undertaking what is arguably their most ambitious modernisation programme to date to build capabilities for futuristic multi-domain operations.

The core concern, they argue, is that rather than nurturing India's emerging defence-industrial base (DIB), the RDPA could force domestic manufacturers into direct competition with some of the world's largest defence conglomerates for contracts that aatmanirbharta was intended to reserve for indigenous industry. Such competition, they contend, would be inherently unequal as US defence companies possess unmatched research and development (R&D) resources, mature technologies and extensive combat-proven portfolios, casting serious doubt on whether formal reciprocity could ever translate into genuine competitive parity between the two countries.

"A poorly negotiated RDPA could effectively turn the biblical story of David and Goliath on its head," said the head of a leading private defence company, speaking on condition of anonymity. In this version, Goliath would prevail because the contest would be inherently unequal, he added.

The official further cautioned that unless Delhi secured meaningful safeguards on technology transfer, intellectual property rights (IPR), local manufacturing, procurement preferences and genuinely reciprocal market access, the balance would remain heavily tilted in favour of US defence giants.

But given the hard bargaining that has characterised ongoing India-US trade talks, which has often reflected an uneven negotiating balance favouring Washington, he anticipated that similar asymmetries could shape the final contours of the RDPA. In such a scenario, most domestic defence manufacturers could well end up as "subordinates" to US companies, supplying only components and sub-assemblies within production chains controlled by American prime contractors, rather than evolving into competitive manufacturers in their own right.

Such concerns stem from a simple reality: reciprocity in principle does not necessarily translate into reciprocity in practice when the two defence-industrial bases differ so profoundly in scale, financial strength and technological depth.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), US defence companies generated $334 billion in arms revenues in 2023, accounting for around half the total revenues of the world's 100 largest defence companies, while their Indian counterparts accounted for barely 1.1%.

This imbalance is equally obvious in the global arms market, where the US accounted for 42% of all major international arms exports in SIPRI's latest assessment - more than four times the share of the second-largest exporter, France, at 9.8%. Against this backdrop, Indian officials believe that reciprocity is easier to proclaim than to achieve, unless the RDPA is framed on terms that preserve - and strengthen - India's ability to build an independent and globally competitive DIB.

Moreover, Indian companies vying for US defence contracts under a reciprocal framework would, in principle, be entering one of the world's most competitive and tightly regulated procurement markets. US defence contracts invariably include stringent financial solvency and balance-sheet requirements designed to ensure that prospective contractors possess the resources to execute long-term, multi-billion-dollar programmes.

In this context, such requirements would constitute a significant, almost insurmountable barrier for Indian firms, favouring established American defence giants like Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, General Dynamics and others, whose individual annual revenues exceed the combined turnover of much of the country's public and private defence industry. Coupled with unmatched R&D resources and decades of experience in designing, producing and sustaining some of the world's most advanced military systems, these structural advantages would cast US defence firms as the proverbial Goliaths, with Indian companies assuming the role of the aforementioned David - but one unlikely to prevail.

Besides, access to the US defence market would not be straightforward even for Indian companies that eventually attained the necessary financial scale to bid for Pentagon contracts. They would also have to satisfy demanding cybersecurity, data protection and procurement compliance requirements, including the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) and the Defence Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), which govern the handling of sensitive US military information. These requirements would be difficult, if not impossible, to meet without significant compliance costs and deep integration into US defence supply-chain ecosystems, further underscoring the extent to which the deck is stacked against Indian companies and calling into question the reciprocity underpinning the RDPA.

At the same time, the stark reality of India's DIB is that many of its domestic private defence industry players are relative newcomers, having entered the field in earnest only over the past decade or so following governmental efforts to encourage aatmanirbharta. Many of these firms had invested heavily in production facilities, research, skilled manpower and technology.

However, if the RDPA were to fundamentally reshape the defence procurement landscape, many in the industry ask who ultimately stands to benefit. For them, the answer is self-evident, with many pointing to established US companies as the principal beneficiaries.

Conversely, supporters of the RDPA argue that closer integration with the US military-industrial complex would expose India's private and state-owned defence companies to advanced manufacturing practices, strengthen supply chains, raise quality standards and accelerate the adoption of sophisticated production technologies. In their view, this would help domestic firms become more competitive internationally, integrate more deeply into global defence supply chains and build on the steady growth in India's defence exports by opening new markets and production opportunities.

A broad cross-section of defence industry executives, however, takes a more guarded view. They argue that such gains are far from automatic and may, in practice, prove uneven and constrained. Without assured technology transfer, meaningful access to intellectual property, and genuine opportunities for indigenous design and development, Indian firms risk being confined to lower-value tiers of global production chains, with limited progression towards system integration or prime contractor status.

Underlying this concern is India's longstanding expectation that major defence partnerships will involve substantial technology transfer, an expectation that sits uneasily with US export control regimes, particularly the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which treat advanced military technologies as tightly guarded strategic assets.

These constraints are perhaps best illustrated by the protracted negotiations over the General Electric GE-F414 fighter engine. Although the proposed arrangement envisages one of the most extensive technology transfer programmes ever offered in this category, around 20% of the engine's most critical manufacturing know-how is reportedly expected to remain outside the transfer framework, highlighting the structural limits of the US's willingness to part with its most sensitive defence technologies.

Meanwhile, beyond the commercial and regulatory hurdles, the US-India defence-industrial relationship cannot be divorced from the wider strategic environment, where longstanding policy differences and mutual suspicions, dating back decades, continue to shape decision-making in both capitals.

India's continuing reliance on Russian military equipment - including the S-400 'Triumf' air defence system more recently, and extensive legacy inventories of fighter and transport aircraft, helicopters, tanks, warships, submarines, missile systems and numerous other platforms and systems - remains a persistent concern in Washington from both technology security and supply-chain perspectives. Many in the US policy establishment continue to view the integration of advanced American systems into an ecosystem heavily dependent on Russian materiel as one posing potential counter-intelligence and operational security risks.

Alongside, periodic US efforts to re-engage Pakistan - and, more recently, to stabilise relations with China for broader geopolitical reasons - continue to fuel doubts in Delhi over the long-term reliability and consistency of US strategic policy. Such divergences underscore a broader reality: despite growing defence cooperation, India and the US continue to pursue distinct strategic priorities, making it difficult to insulate defence-industrial collaboration from wider geopolitical considerations, or to jointly negotiate an RDPA that is genuinely balanced and mutually beneficial.

The proposed RDPA also raises an awkward strategic question that has received little public attention: where would it leave India's long-standing defence partners, notably France and Israel, which continue to play a central role in equipping India's armed forces with advanced combat aircraft, missile systems and other high-end military capabilities?

Both have consistently demonstrated a willingness to transfer military technology, undertake joint development, establish manufacturing facilities in India and support indigenous production with relatively few political conditions. French and Israeli companies have, in recent years, become deeply embedded in India's defence-industrial ecosystem, contributing to programmes ranging from combat aircraft, aero-engines and missiles to air-defence systems, electronic warfare, sensors, avionics and unmanned systems.

If the RDPA were to substantially ease access for US companies to India's defence procurement programmes, these manufacturers would inevitably face far stronger competition for contracts they have traditionally been well placed to secure, potentially reshaping the competitive dynamics of India's defence market and industrial partnerships. The broader question, therefore, is whether deepening one strategic partnership could inadvertently come at the expense of others that have played a significant role in India's military modernisation and DIB development.

According to one senior military analyst with direct knowledge of the RDPA negotiations, the India-US defence relationship is increasingly transactional, driven by hard-headed national interests rather than shared ideals. But translating this into a workable RDPA, he cautioned, speaking on condition of anonymity, will require an unprecedented degree of 'political will, regulatory alignment and bureaucratic coordination on both sides that may prove difficult to achieve and none of which can be taken for granted'.

Ultimately, however, from India's perspective, the RDPA will be judged not by the number of contracts it facilitates or the rhetoric it generates, but by whether it strengthens the country's DIB by advancing the objectives of aatmanirbharta - or merely replaces one form of external dependence with another under the banner of reciprocity.